The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Game theory provides a framework for modeling a wide range of security and defense problems. This project focuses on Stackelberg strategies, which are optimal when one player can commit to a (possibly randomized) strategy before the other player moves. For example, a defensive unit can commit to a randomized patrolling pattern to deter attacks. 
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Scientific Progress
Our JAIR'11 paper (Korzhyk, Yin, Kiekintveld, Conitzer, and Tambe) significantly extends our AAMAS'10 paper. In this paper, we investigate the role of commitment and the assumption that the attacker can observe the defender's strategy; without this assumption, we have a simultaneous-move game and Nash equilibrium would be a more natural solution concept to use. We prove that under a natural restriction on the family of games, defender Stackelberg strategies must also be Nash strategies, and moreover that the Nash equilibria are interchangeable. This interchangeability property means that if one player plays according to one equilibrium and the other player according to another equilibrium, the result is guaranteed to still be an equilibrium. In general games, this is not always true, leading to the dreaded ``equilibrium selection problem'' that a player does not know according to which equilibrium to play---but thanks to the interchangeability property, in these security games we need not worry about choosing the wrong equilibrium, and in particular by the first result we can just choose the Stackelberg strategy. Hence, Stackelberg strategies are robust to changes in the game model that concern commitment and observability. We also ran simulations on games that do not satisfy the properties needed for Stackelberg strategies to also be Nash strategies; the simulations suggest that Stackelberg strategies are still often Nash strategies in these games, except when the attacker can perform complex coordinated attacks in multiple locations.
In an IJCAI'11 paper (Korzhyk, Conitzer, Parr), we further study this problem of an attacker that performs multiple simultaneous attacks. While (as was shown in the JAIR paper) Stackelberg strategies are not usually also Nash strategies in this context, we show that at least the interchangeability property of Nash equilibria is still satisfied, so one still does not need to worry about which equilibrium strategy is thè`r ight'' one. We also give a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a Nash equilibrium in this context, which initializes the number of defender resources at zero and gradually increases them to the desired number, all the while maintaining an equilibrium of the game. On the other hand, we show that computing a Stackelberg strategy is actually NP-hard. (These results were surprising to us, because, in contrast, in two-player normal-form games, computing a Stackelberg strategy can be done in polynomial time, whereas computing a Nash equilibrium is PPAD-complete and computing an optimal Nash equilibrium is NP-hard.)
Of course, this still does not resolve what to do in such games when one is not sure whether the attacker can observe the mixed strategy (and, hence, whether Stackelberg or Nash is the right model). Our JAIR paper above does propose a game model in which this uncertainty is modeled explicitly, but it does not provide any algorithm for solving these games. In an AAMAS'11 paper (Korzhyk, Conitzer, Parr), we propose an algorithm for solving these games that uses Nash and Stackelberg solvers as subroutines. (The algorithm will work on any game for which such solvers are available.) We show that in simulations a small number of calls to these solvers is sufficient to solve the games.
In another (still unpublished) draft (Letchford, Korzhyk, Conitzer), we study, for various classes of games including security games, how much can be gained by having the ability to commit to a strategy before the other player moves. We find that usually games can be constructed where the gains from commitment are extreme, though when taking an average over many randomly drawn games, the benefits from commitment tend to be much less extreme.
In another AAMAS'11 paper (Jain, Korzhyk, Vanek, Conitzer, Pechoucek, Tambe), we study the ``Mumbai problem'': in response to the 2008 terrorist attacks on Mumbai, the Mumbai police have started to set up checkpoints in
Crucially, we do allow the targets to have varying values, which makes an earlier exact approach inapplicable; we also show that an existing approximate approach can be arbitrarily suboptimal. We present the RUGGED (Randomization in Urban Graphs by Generating strategies for Enemy and Defender) algorithm, which uses column and constraint generation techniques to incrementally add strategies to the game until convergence to an optimal solution, and show that it scales to the southern part of Mumbai.
In a AAAI'11 paper (Conitzer and Korzhyk), we study the computation of Stackelberg strategies in general normal-form games. We show that there is a close relationship between the standard linear program for computing a correlated equilibrium of a game (a fairly well-known relaxation of the concept of Nash equilibrium), and the linear-programming approach for computing Stackelberg strategies. This suggests a new linear-programming approach for computing Stackelberg strategies, and in our simulations on 50x50 games this new formulation is faster than the standard approach that involves solving multiple LPs. Perhaps more importantly, it gives a way to extend this approach to more than two players --specifically, to settings with a single leader and an arbitrary number of followers. This generalization to more than two players does require that the leader can send signals to the followers. (Similarly, in a correlated equilibrium, a mediator sends signals to all the players.)
Technology Transfer
Efficient Algorithms for Computing Stackelberg Strategies in Security Games Final Report
Vincent Conitzer and Ronald Parr Duke University
Statement of the problem studied
Game theory provides a framework for modeling a wide range of security and defense problems. This project focuses on Stackelberg strategies, which are optimal when one player can commit to a (possibly randomized) strategy before the other player moves. For example, a defensive unit can commit to a randomized patrolling pattern to deter attacks. This project explores new approaches for efficiently computing Stackelberg strategies in realistic security domains with exponentially large strategy spaces. Potential impacts of this research include increased ability to compute optimal strategies for security and defense scenarios.
Notable contributions of the project include:
1. New algorithms and complexity results for security games as well as unrestricted games. The algorithms allow us to solve new classes of games efficiently; the complexity results indicate that other methods are needed for richer classes of games.
2. A deeper understanding of the role of commitment and the assumption that the attacker can observe the defender's strategy. These results indicate that, in a sense, Stackelberg strategies are "safe" to play even when this assumption does not hold, in some security domains (but not alland to address this shortcoming, we also provide a methodology for other security games).
Summary of the most important results
Our JAIR'11 paper [5] significantly extends our AAMAS'10 paper. In this paper, we investigate the role of commitment and the assumption that the attacker can observe the defender's strategy; without this assumption, we have a simultaneous-move game and Nash equilibrium would be a more natural solution concept to use. We prove that under a natural restriction on the family 1 of games, defender Stackelberg strategies must also be Nash strategies, and moreover that the Nash equilibria are interchangeable. This interchangeability property means that if one player plays according to one equilibrium and the other player according to another equilibrium, the result is guaranteed to still be an equilibrium. In general games, this is not always true, leading to the dreaded "equilibrium selection problem" that a player does not know according to which equilibrium to play-but thanks to the interchangeability property, in these security games we need not worry about choosing the wrong equilibrium, and in particular by the first result we can just choose the Stackelberg strategy. Hence, Stackelberg strategies are robust to changes in the game model that concern commitment and observability. We also ran simulations on games that do not satisfy the properties needed for Stackelberg strategies to also be Nash strategies; the simulations suggest that Stackelberg strategies are still often Nash strategies in these games, except when the attacker can perform complex coordinated attacks in multiple locations.
In an IJCAI'11 paper [3] , we further study this problem of an attacker that performs multiple simultaneous attacks. While (as was shown in the JAIR paper) Stackelberg strategies are not usually also Nash strategies in this context, we show that at least the interchangeability property of Nash equilibria is still satisfied, so one still does not need to worry about which equilibrium strategy is the "right" one. We also give a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a Nash equilibrium in this context, which initializes the number of defender resources at zero and gradually increases them to the desired number, all the while maintaining an equilibrium of the game. On the other hand, we show that computing a Stackelberg strategy is actually NP-hard. (These results were surprising to us, because, in contrast, in two-player normal-form games, computing a Stackelberg strategy can be done in polynomial time, whereas computing a Nash equilibrium is PPAD-complete and computing an optimal Nash equilibrium is NP-hard.)
Of course, this still does not resolve what to do in such games when one is not sure whether the attacker can observe the mixed strategy (and, hence, whether Stackelberg or Nash is the right model). Our JAIR paper above does propose a game model in which this uncertainty is modeled explicitly, but it does not provide any algorithm for solving these games. In an AAMAS'11 paper [4] , we propose an algorithm for solving these games that uses Nash and Stackelberg solvers as subroutines. (The algorithm will work on any game for which such solvers are available.) We show that in simulations a small number of calls to these solvers is sufficient to solve the games.
In another (still unpublished) draft [6] , we study, for various classes of games including security games, how much can be gained by having the ability to commit to a strategy before the other player moves. We find that usually games can be constructed where the gains from commitment are extreme, though when taking an average over many randomly drawn games, the benefits from commitment tend to be much less extreme.
In another AAMAS'11 paper [2] , we study the "Mumbai problem": in response to the 2008 terrorist attacks on Mumbai, the Mumbai police have started to set up checkpoints in the city; how can we allocate these in a game-theoretically optimal way? We model this (for now) as a zero-sum game between a defender and an attacker on a graph, where the defender chooses edges in the graph to defend and the attacker chooses a target and a path to that target. Crucially, we do allow the targets to have varying values, which makes an earlier exact approach inapplicable; we also show that an existing approximate approach can be arbitrarily suboptimal. We present the RUGGED (Randomization in Urban Graphs by Generating strategies for Enemy and Defender) algorithm, which uses column and constraint generation techniques to incrementally add strategies to the game until convergence to an optimal solution, and show that it scales to the southern part of Mumbai.
In a AAAI'11 paper [1] , we study the computation of Stackelberg strategies in general normal-form games. We show that there is a close relationship between the standard linear program for computing a correlated equilibrium of a game (a fairly well-known relaxation of the concept of Nash equilibrium), and the linear-programming approach for computing Stackelberg strategies. This suggests a new linear-programming approach for computing Stackelberg strategies, and in our simulations on 50x50 games this new formulation is faster than the standard approach that involves solving multiple LPs. Perhaps more importantly, it gives a way to extend this approach to more than two playersspecifically, to settings with a single leader and an arbitrary number of followers. This generalization to more than two players does require that the leader can send signals to the followers. (Similarly, in a correlated equilibrium, a mediator sends signals to all the players.) 
